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To Live And To Die is a collection of essays on ethical problems
that would be of interest to medical students and physicians. The
book resulted from a course given
on these topics under the direction of the editor of the book,
Robert H. Williams, M.D. All the
topics have to do with the control
and way of life made possible by
recent scientific and technical
progress, although not all of them
would be classified as medical
ethics, or even bioethics. Such
subjects, for instance, as campus
protest, the choice of a career,
and maniage are treated in the
collection.
Williams himself, besides contributing a lengthy prologue and
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epilogue to the book, was responsible for several chapters on specific topics. His own ethics would
have to be classified as liberal and
purely secular or humanistic. He
shows little understanding of, and
less sympathy for, a religious ethic. He sees little value in suffering. To escape it, he can find no
fault with positive euthanasia at
the request of the patient, or even
suicide. Contraception is preferable to abortion, but if it fails
abortion should be used as a
hackup.
Williams sees no more than a
difference of degree between abortion and contraception. Since
there is life both in the sperm and
the ovum, even contraception in127

volves " killing. " Abortion differs
only in that the killing takes place
at a later stage of development.
Williams is really repeating here
an old scholastic position, but unlike the scholastics he uses the
analogy not to condemn contraception, but to justify abortion.
I t was easier to argue for a difference of degree between contraception and abortion in the days
when it was thought that the
male semen (the ovum was not
yet discovered, nor even the
sperm) was the sole source of procreation. It is less easy to take
this position in the light of present knowledge that "new life" begins with fertilization .
As for human life, Williams
seems to build it around rational
function, which he calls mentation. Without mentation the body
is of no use, and without mentation there is no soul. Even if one
were to presume that the soul
comes and goes with actual mentation (as he seems to imply, but
which one would hesitate to do) ,
since mentation is not in itself a
sensible phenomenon, it would
not be easy to establish its absence. The absence of mentation
would hardly be useful as a criterion for a euthanasia decision ,
which Williams would want it
to be.
Two Different Approaches
to Morality
It would be impossible to consider adequately in a brief review
all the issues taken up in this
book, but it may be helpful to the
reader to give some attention to a
confrontation between two differ-
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ent approaches to morality as reflected in the articles of Arthur
Dyck and Joseph Fletcher on euthanasia. Dyck takes the traditional stand a g a ins t positive
euthanasia; it is a violation of the
injunction against killing. But
there is a difference against causing death and permitting one to
die (by not using extraordinary
means). There is also a difference
between administering a drug to
cause death and administering it
to relieve pain, even though it has
the added effect of shortening
life. One might ask what is the
difference if death follows in both
cases. Dyck argues that the person who takes a drug to relieve
pain is not making a choice of
death but a choice of how to live
while dying. Similarly, one who
decides not to use extraordinary
means is not making a choice of
death but only a choice of how to
spend his last days in the most
meaningful way. He is making
exactly the same choices he might
make during his life to take a
drug to relieve a headache, or
simply to see a doctor or not.
But to cause one's own death
is to decide that one's life has no
worth for anyone. I t is also a way
of shutting other people out of
your life. Also, if one can take his
life whenever he decides it is
meaningless, why does he have to
wait until he is dying? Why can not he make the decision whenever during his life he decides it
is meaningless? For these and
other reasons Dyck cannot justify
positive euthanasia.
Joseph Fletcher, on the conLinacre Quarterly

trary, finds it harder to justify
letting a person die a slow and
ugly death than helping him escape from such misery. This is a
euphemistic way of saying that it
is preferable for a doctor to put a
patient to death in these circumstances. Fletcher says rightly that
it is ridiculous to give ethical approval to ending "subhuman" life
in utero, as is done in abortion,
and refuse to end "subhuman"
life in extremis. Unfortunately,
instead of using the analogy to
show that abortion is wrong he
uses it to try to justify positive
euthanasia. The real question
here, according to Fletcher, is not
whether you are permitting death
or causing it, rather, it is whether
you have a proportionate reason.
If you have a proportionate reason, it does not make any difference to Fletcher whether you kill
a person or let him die. While he
admits that not any end will
justify an evil means, h!l holds
that a proportionate good will.
Basically, Fletcher is espousing
here a morality of consequences
which judges moral acts according to the goodness or badness of
their consequences. He would justify positive euthanasia, presumably, as an escape from the misery of a slow death.
Fletcher contrasts t his approach with that of the so-called
deontologist, who argues that an
act is good or bad according as it
conforms to a rule - and independently of the consequences.
According to the deontologist positive euthanasia is wrong because
it violates the rule : Thou shalt
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not kill! Strictly speaking, the
deontologist approach is Kantian,
and it is a little simplistic to
group all other moral systems under this heading. In the traditional scholastic position killing an
innocent person is not wrong because there is a rule against it.
There is a rule against it because
it is wrong for other reasons. But
it is wrong not precisely because
it has bad consequences, but because it goes against man's rational nature to kill an innocent
fellowman. It asserts a superiority
that has no rational foundation.
The fact that in an individual
case or situation good consequences might result from such a
killing will not justify it. The end
does not justify the means. It was
on this basis, for instance, that
St. Thomas refused to allow a
mother to be cut open to provide
for the baptism of a baby who
could not otherwise be baptized.
In the thirteenth century performing a caesarean section on a
live mother was tantamount to
taking her life. Even though the
spiritual welfare of the child (certainly a proportionate reason)
was being weighed against the
temporal welfare of the mother,
St. Thomas did not think the operation could be performed, and
precisely because a good end
would not justify a bad means.
In all fairness to consequentialists it should be said that not all
of them would agree with Fletcher that there is a "proportionate
reason" for positive euthanasia.
As Dyck points out, while many
would admit the possibility of a
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proportiona te good resulting if
one considers only the patient,
they would fear the consequences
of allowing a practice like this to
begin. It would be on the basis of
such "secondary" consequences
that they would condemn it.
Monogamous Marriage Examined
In a chapter on marriage David
R. Mace raises the question of
the future of monogamous marriage. He faces openly all the reasons that put it in question. First,
there is the shift in emphasis
from marriage as a social and
familial institution to marriage
as a means of personal and interpersonal fulfillment. Given the
population problem, there is no
need for every marriage to be procreative. In fact, procreation might
be carried on in a way more genetically satisfying, if only select
men and women were to have children. Similarly, there may no longer be need of the family as a place
to nurture children. Conceivably,
this could be carried on in a more
sophisticated and professional
way through other media. Nor is
there the same reason in modern
society for confining sexual relations to a marital union. Sexual
jealousy does not seem to ha:ve
the same destructive force that it
had in the past. There seems to
be no need of the traditional
sexual exclusiveness of the marriage bond, which raises the question whether it is necessary at all.
Really, love and creativity are essentially spontaneous, which implies that an atmosphere of obligation and commitment is not
the best for fostering them. There
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are eve!). those who do not think
that young people should be required to make a life commitment
at a time when they are incapable
of grasping its meaning.
While admitting that marriage
today is in trouble, Mace protests
that there are also some very successful marriages in our society.
Rather than abandon traditional
marriage precipitously, would it
not be better to examine these
successful marriages to discover
why they succeeded? He pleads
that in our modern world, where
one can get lost in impersonalism,
there is more need for a relation
in depth with some other person
than ever before. Does not marriage offer a unique opportunity
for such an experience - one
which most people crave today a deeply satisfying, dependable
relationship of complete openness,
complete trust and complete sharing of life with one loved person
of the opposite sex? Mace is obviously not overwhelmed by the
arguments against monogamous
marriage.
The chapter on homosexuality,
transvestism and transsexualism,
while brief, seems fairly well balanced. The aut h 0 r, John L.
Hampson, makes it clear that he
is dealing with an adult homosexual orientation, not with a
passing stage or superficial homosexual conduct. On the legal level,
he is in favor of not legislating
against consensual acts between
adults. He does not think that
homosexuality is a disease in the
strict sense of the term, but finds
it more useful to look upon it as a
Linacre Quarterly

developmental problem. It is a
disorientation acquired early in
life as the result of certain nonstandard experiences. In view of
this, while he is willing to refrain
from applying such terms as sickness or illness to it, he does not
agree that it is simply an alternative life style. Since it results
from atypical psychosexual development, the homosexual has
no more choice in his life style
than the heterosexual. As for the
possibility of reorientation, he
says that perhaps one-third of
homosexuals can be successfully
treated. This is a little more optimistic than some estimates, a
little less than others.
He touches only sketchily on
transvestism and transsexualism.
He breaks transvestism down into
three types: the type who uses
female dress for erotic stimulation, the compulsive type, and
the expressive type who merely
wants to express a feminine side
of his personality (they are all
men). This last type differs from
the transsexual in that these
transvestites do not con sid e r
themselves females trapped in a
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male body. There has not been
much success in dealing with the
erotic or expressive type transvestite. More success has been
reported in the hormonal and
surgical t rea t men t of transsexuals, but authors other than
Hampson do not feel that we
have enough long-term experience
with this type of therapy to be
confident about it. Hampson concludes wisely that our ultimate
goal should be rather the prevention of such disorders as transsexualism.
The reader will find a number
of other interesting topics treated
in the present book. He will find
it profitable reading, even though
he may not always find himself
in agreement with opinions expressed in it. He will regret also
the complete absence of any recognition of the contribution which
Catholic moral theologians have
made to the field of medical ethics over the past centuries.
Reviewed by:
John Connery, S.J.
Bellarmine School of Theology
Chicago, Illinois
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